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Consumers often have little knowledge about the extent of privacy risks taken when 
using mobile applications (apps) on their smartphones, and are unlikely to be informed by 
federal regulations or privacy certifications. A survey was distributed to smartphone users 
to determine their perceptions and knowledge of privacy risks in mobile apps, and if 
these perceptions vary in different contexts (i.e., a health app vs. flashlight app). This 
study found that people appear to see privacy in mobile apps as contingent and context-
dependent. While smartphone users were found to have a good understanding of privacy 
risks, they considered user rating and price to be more important factors to consider than 
privacy when selecting a mobile app. Presentation, clarity, and context all influence 
people’s decisions to install and use mobile apps. This study has important implications 
for how privacy permissions and ratings can be presented to best inform consumer 
decisions.  
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Introduction 
In the last decade, the use of mobile technology has grown at an incredible 
rate. The rapid adoption of mobile phones, especially smartphones, by consumers created 
a new market for mobile applications (mobile apps). Mobile apps often combine 
smartphone capabilities for accessing global positioning systems (GPS) and networks 
such as 3G and 34 to create interfaces for social networks sites, news feeds, games, health 
trackers, and even banking. As a result, mobile apps combine all kinds of personal 
information, some highly sensitive, into one device. 
Because mobile apps are useful and convenient, consumers often install and use 
them with little regard for privacy risks. Mass data collection has become part of 
everyday life as people rely on the mobile technology for monitoring, storing, and 
distributing data (Shklovski, Mainwaring, Skúladóttir, & Borgthorsson, 2014). Mobile 
devices can automatically collect and distribute users’ location, personal information, and 
behavior in real-time. These privacy threats are different than online privacy threats, and 
potentially more serious (Xu, Gupta, Rosson, & Carroll, 2012). For example, pictures and 
social media posts can reveal social relationships; geographical data can reveal current 
and past locations; and accelerometer data can be used to identify the user’s current 
activities.  
 Efforts by federal agencies and private sector organizations in the United States to 
regulate mobile apps or set certification standards are limited, and are mostly related to 
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mobile health apps. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has the authority to 
regulate “medical devices” (Furberg, 2013). Only mobile apps that meet the FDA’s 
definition of a medical device fall under the FDA’s jurisdiction, and, even then, the 
regulation of medical device apps is primarily for safety and effectiveness purposes 
(Furberg, 2013). Private organizations like Happtique developed standards for mobile 
health apps that include operability, privacy, security, and content (Misra, 2014). In 2014, 
however, they experienced a setback when security flaws were found in a number of their 
certified mobile apps (Misra, 2014). The certification process was also very lengthy and 
complicated; the company had only been able to certify 70 mobile apps after one year. 
Because the mobile app market is relatively cheap and easy to enter, it is difficult, if not 
impossible, for federal agencies and certification companies to keep up with the volume 
of mobile apps available.  
 For now, consumers will need to make their own decisions in a “buyer beware” 
market. Information privacy research can help explain some consumer behavior in 
selecting and using mobile apps despite their privacy risks. Information privacy research 
is not new, but has largely changed with the growth of new technologies, especially 
mobile-based ones (Smith, Dinev, & Xu, 2011). The research in this area is preliminary, 
and is mostly found in conference proceedings. This study will add to this area of 
research by examining people's knowledge and perceptions of privacy risks in mobile 
apps. In particular, this study will determine if people have different privacy risk 
concerns in different contexts, and how they negotiate privacy risks when selecting apps 
and allowing privacy permissions. The specific research questions are: 
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R1. How does selection of a mobile app differ when the privacy rating, user 
rating, and price are altered? Which of these factors is considered most important when 
selecting an app? 
R2. How do people negotiate privacy risks when allowing privacy permissions, 
and do their choices vary in different contexts (i.e., a complex vs. simple app)?  
R3. What level of knowledge of mobile app privacy risks do adults who own 
smartphones have? 
R4. Does age, gender, type of smartphone, and level of experience affect privacy 
risk knowledge? 
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Literature Review 
This literature review will describe 1) several of the most predominant theories in 
information privacy in relation in mobile apps; 2) common privacy risks and issues in 
mobile apps; 3) consumers’ attitudes and perceptions regarding mobile apps and privacy; 
and 4) researchers’ methods for raising user awareness of privacy risks and influencing 
decision-making.  
Information Privacy Theories 
Privacy Calculus. One of the most prevalent theories about information privacy 
and disclosure is privacy calculus, or the notion of privacy as a commodity (Keith, Babb, 
& Lowry, 2014; Smith et al., 2011). According to this theory, disclosing information is 
considered a trade-off between benefits and costs. This tradeoff can create a privacy 
paradox where people claim they have high levels of privacy concerns, but still release 
private information in many circumstances (Smith et al., 2011). A person's concept of 
privacy changes depending on the benefits he or she expects to receive.  For example, 
some people may be willing to enter personal health information in order to use a food 
and nutrition tracker, which they see as highly beneficial. Norberg and colleagues found 
that for all types of information, including financial, personal identification, and 
preferences, actual disclosure of information exceeded the individual's’ intentions 
(Norberg, Horne, & Horne, 2007). Another study found evidence of a privacy calculus in 
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their nationally representative survey of U.S. and Japanese smartphone users (n=1114 
U.S. participants and n=2000 Japanese participants) (Fife & Orjuela, 2012). Their results 
suggest that people are generally not aware that their data are collected or sold to a third 
party; instead, their actions are influenced by habits, expectations, and cultural practices.  
Other researchers have expanded the idea of a privacy paradox to include 
personalization. When using a mobile device, one of the benefits that users consider is 
personalization. Personalization can potentially make the experience of using a mobile 
device more gratifying by delivering individualized services (Sutanto, Palme, Tan, & 
Phang, 2013). In order to reap the benefits of individualized services, users may forfeit 
their privacy. In a study comparing a non-personalized mobile app to a personalized one, 
Sutano and colleagues found that participants used the personalized one more, but their 
satisfaction was undermined by increased privacy concerns (Sutanto, 2013). Interestingly, 
their dissatisfaction with privacy concerns was not enough to overcome the benefits of 
using the personalized mobile app.   
 Two limitations of the privacy calculus are that it does not account for risks and 
benefits over time or bounded rationality. Individuals often have limited information, 
time, and knowledge when making decisions about privacy (Acquisti & Grossklags, 
2005). Given a greater knowledge of the risks, or the time to consider them, users may 
behave differently. Further, information disclosure decisions can change over time. 
Individuals may discount future risk for present benefits, but become more concerned 
with privacy risk once the benefit has been achieved (Keith et al., 2014).   
 Prospect Theory. Privacy calculus can often predict information disclosure 
intentions, but it does not predict actual behavior, especially future behavior, as well. 
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Prospect theory can better account for privacy-related behavior over time. Instead of 
considering risks and benefits at that moment, individuals consider reference points when 
making decisions (Keith et al., 2014). For example, if the benefits of disclosing 
information are increasing over time, the individual is in a “gain” position from their 
original reference point, and will become more risk averse. On the other side, if the 
benefits of information disclosure are decreasing over time, the individual is in a “loss” 
position, and will be willing to disclose more information to get back to the original 
reference point. This theory was supported in Keith and colleagues’ longitudinal study of 
information privacy on mobile devices. In contrast to most studies on privacy risks, this 
study calculated user’s actual behaviors versus their intentions by having participants use 
a mobile app for 12 weeks. They found that the participants’ behavior followed prospect 
theory more closely than privacy calculus theory. This means that participants became 
more risk adverse in a gain position, and less risk adverse in a loss position. Though this 
is the only mobile app privacy study done based on prospect theory, the use of actual 
behavior versus intended behavior gives it a strong research design that other studies 
should follow if possible.  
 Contextual Integrity Theory. While the above theories are concerned with how 
people choose to disclose information, Helen Nissenbaum’s theory of contextual integrity 
considers context-dependent information flows and social norms (Nissenbaum, 2010).  In 
other words, in different contexts people have different privacy expectations, or, as 
Nissenbaum describes them, personal information flows. What constitutes personal 
information in one context may be different in another. In terms of mobile devices and 
apps, people use apps in a variety of different contexts. Certain privacy risks may be 
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considered appropriate for some mobile apps (location sharing in a GPS app), but not in 
others (location sharing in a dictionary app).  
A couple of studies examine context and privacy in terms of mobile apps (Lin et 
al., 2012; Shklovski et al., 2014). Shklovski’s study investigated attitudes towards data 
leakage and tracking on smartphones in different contexts through interviews (n=13), and 
a survey (n=187) (Shklovski et al., 2014). He made several findings, including that 
people’s expectations of appropriate tracking and data gathering varied between different 
types of apps.  The notion of “creepiness” that many participants described in their 
interviews was due to the realization that the apps were more than they seemed, and were 
acting in ways the participants did not agree to or expect. Lin and colleagues had similar 
findings in their study of privacy expectations and purposes (Lin et al., 2012). Using 
crowdsourcing on Amazon Mechanical Turk, they had the particpants check off what 
type of privacy permissions they would consider reasonable for various types of mobile 
apps. Like in Shklovski’s study, participants were highly concerned when mobile apps 
collected information they did not expect; however, Lin and colleagues found that if users 
were informed why a given data was being used, their privacy concerns could be allayed 
to some extent.  
Common Privacy Risks in Mobile Apps 
Before analyzing people’s perceptions of apps, it is useful to first see what 
privacy risks are prevalent in mobile apps, and how are they presented to consumers in 
the app itself or in its description in the app store. Most of these studies focus specifically 
on health-related mobile apps or location-based apps due to their clearly personal nature.  
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One approach to studying privacy issues in mobile apps is analyzing the content 
of privacy policies. Sunyaev and colleagues assessed the availability, scope, and 
transparency of health-related mobile app privacy policies (Sunyaev, Dehling, Taylor, & 
Mandl, 2014). Of the 600 most popular apps on the iOS and Android stores, only 30.5% 
had privacy policies, and these policies were very long and written at a college reading 
level (Sunyaev et al., 2014). If users wanted to read the privacy policies, which may not 
be likely, the policies may be too difficult to understand or not even available. A report 
from the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse analyzed the privacy policies, permissions 
required, and content of 43 popular health and fitness apps, both paid and free 
(Ackerman, 2013). They found that 26% of free apps and 40% of paid apps had no 
privacy policy, and that less than 50% of apps notify users of information they make 
public or send to third-parties (Ackerman, 2013). Note that this report may have inherent 
bias due to the authors’ affiliation; however, their analysis started with no knowledge of 
the mobile apps selected, and the evaluation was carefully documented and made 
available on their website. Mobile app privacy policies are not easily accessible to 
consumers either because they do not exist or because they are written and presented in a 
way that no one would read them.  
Researchers have also used technical analysis of data practices of mobile apps. 
Several studies had users install an app that would track personal data flow. One showed 
that access to address book information is the biggest concern, and that over half of the 
connections made by apps are insecure (Ferreira, Kostakos, Beresford, Lindqvist, & Dey, 
2015). The other study found that the majority of application network data is sent to 
advertisement servers without user consent or knowledge (Enck et al., 2014). In another 
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study, Fu and colleagues found that user location data is frequently sent without the user's 
consent or understanding of the reasons for it (Fu, Yang, Shingte, Lindqvist, & Gruteser, 
2014). The Privacy Rights Clearinghouse also did a technical analysis, and found that 
only 10-13% of apps encrypt all connections to the developer, and that about a third of 
apps tested sent data to a party not covered in the privacy policy (Ackerman, 2013). 
These studies reveal that privacy risks are fairly extensive, and are most related to 
personal information and location services.  
Consumer Attitudes and Preferences towards Privacy Risks in Mobile 
Apps 
 Many studies have sought to find out how much consumers know about privacy 
risks, and what their perceptions of privacy risks in mobile apps are. These studies have 
used a variety of primarily qualitative methods, including surveys, interviews, 
observations, and focus groups, and have identified several themes. 
 First, as per Nissenbaum’s contextual integrity theory, Atienza and colleagues 
have found that consumer attitudes are highly contextualized and more nuanced than the 
privacy paradox suggests (Atienza et al., 2015). In their study of 24 focus groups with 
256 participants, Atienza and colleagues found that participants’ concerns about privacy 
depended on the type of information, where and when the information is accessed, and 
who is seeing the data. Control was an important issue. Many participants were willing to 
reveal personal information in order to reap the benefits of personalization and 
usefulness, but wanted to control when and where this happened.   
 Several studies show that privacy concerns vary by age, degree of use, and risk 
knowledge. One study found that the degree of concern about privacy and security issues 
increased as age increased (Fife & Orjuela, 2012). They suggested that this could be 
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because older adults tend to have less experience with mobile devices. A study of African 
American young adults found that the participants were not generally concerned about 
privacy (Park & Jang, 2014). The young adults were generally unaware of data leakage or 
third party advertisers, and referred instead to interpersonal privacy concerns such as 
locking their phone so a family member could not access it. Perceived skill level also 
appears to influence privacy concerns. As consumers’ perceived skill level increases, 
they seem less concerned with privacy, perhaps due to increased use of mobile devices, 
or confidence in their ability to control the situation (Keith, Thompson, Hale, Lowry, & 
Greer, 2013). Another study by Pew Research, however, found no consistent 
demographic answers by age, income, education, or gender when participants were asked 
about their opinions on data sharing in various contexts (Rainie, et. al., 2016). Consumer 
attitudes toward privacy are overall nuanced, contextual, and possibly related to age, 
skills, and degree of use.   
Methods for influencing or informing consumers’ decisions about 
privacy  
Because many consumers have little knowledge of privacy risks and are unlikely 
to be informed by federal regulations or mobile app certification programs, researchers 
have been developing methods for influencing or informing consumers’ decisions when 
selecting mobile apps.  Android currently has a permission system that is intended to 
inform users about the privacy risks involved with certain mobile apps. Before installing 
an app, the consumer can review the permission requests, and cancel the installation if it 
seems excessive. While this permission system is an important step in providing privacy 
information to consumers, Felt and colleagues in their study of 308 Android users found 
that users had low comprehension of the Android permissions and paid little attention to 
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it (Felt et al., 2012). They concluded that these warnings do not help users make privacy 
decisions.  
 Some studies have modified the Android permission display, or created a new 
one, to see if it would play a more active role in app selection. The first study modified 
the Android permissions display into a simplified privacy checklist that fits on the main 
app description screen (Kelley, Cranor, & Sadeh, 2013). The location of the checklist is 
important because consumers may have already made their decision regardless of the 
privacy permissions if they have already clicked install. In this way, the checklist may be 
more likely to influence consumer decisions. Kelley and colleagues found in both a lab 
study and a large-scale online survey that users noticed the new display, and that it 
affected their selection decisions, especially when deciding between similar apps (Kelley 
et al., 2013). Another couple of studies designed new privacy indicators based on 
warning design theory (Bal, 2014) and visual framing effects (Choe, Jung, Lee, & Fisher, 
2013). Both found that the visual representation of privacy risk quickly and effectively 
informed consumers of the risks involved, and influenced their decisions to some extent. 
Representing privacy risks visually and in a simplified manner before installation appears 
to help inform consumers of privacy risks, and may influence their final decision.  
Literature Review Summary 
Based on the studies above, consumers appear to make cost-benefit decisions 
based on the specific context when it comes to privacy. Many consumers also have little 
knowledge about the extent of the privacy risks taken when using mobile apps.  Further, 
they are unlikely to be informed by federal regulations or privacy certifications because 
the amount of apps available is enormous and grows every day. Visual representation of 
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degree of privacy risk appears to help inform and influence consumers’ decisions. 
However, it is unknown whether these would have an effect in a “real-life” scenario 
where consumers are also considering factors such as user reviews and cost. In 
conducting this literature review, there appears to be a need to determine how people 
negotiate privacy risks when selecting apps and allowing privacy permissions in different 
contexts, and whether privacy risk knowledge and demographic factors correlate with 
these choices.
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Methods 
 The following section will describe the methods, population, sampling, data 
collection, and plans for analysis of this study. 
Selection of Method 
This study will use a self-administered, web-based survey to gather data. A survey 
is ideal for this type of research for several reasons. One, surveys are designed so that 
only small percentage of the population is needed to draw conclusions about the larger 
population (Wildemuth, 2009). This means less time and resources are required to gather 
data. Two, surveys can allow the researcher to analyze several variables at one time. This 
study will analyze several variables, including age, privacy rating, user rating, price, 
privacy permissions, and privacy risk knowledge. The questions in this survey will also 
be close-ended making this analysis easier. Third, web-based surveys can be distributed 
widely and cheaply, which could potentially increase the diversity of the sample. This 
would also allow more subgroups to be represented in the analysis, for example those 
with a high versus low privacy risk knowledge.
Population & Sampling 
The population of interest is adults (18 years and older) who own or use a 
smartphone. This population is purposely broad to enable the identification of subgroups. 
The most important requirement is that the population uses a smartphone, otherwise they 
may not be familiar with mobile apps.  
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A convenience sample was taken by distributing the Qualtrics survey link via an 
email message to university mailing listservs that include undergraduate and post-
graduate students, faculty, and staff. It was also distributed via the investigator’s social 
networks on Facebook and Twitter. Snowball sampling was also used because the 
investigator's friends and family forwarded the link to their contacts. The survey was 
open for a three-week period during which the participants could click on the link and 
submit their responses via Qualtrics. While a convenience sample is not ideal for 
representative sampling, it was sent to different mailing listservs and groups that include 
individuals of different ages and in different locations to attempt to diversify the sample.  
In order to encourage participation, participants were offered the chance to enter a 
drawing for one of four $50 Amazon gift cards. Funding for this incentive was provided 
by a Carnegie Grant through the School of Information and Library Science at the 
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. After completing the questionnaire, 
participants had the option to enter their email address. Email addresses were exported to 
a spreadsheet, and four were selected using a random number generator. These gift cards 
were distributed in March 2016.  
Survey Content 
The survey consisted of four sections. 
Section 1: Demographics. This section first confirmed that the participant is over 
the age of 18 and owns a smartphone, which are both requirements to take this survey. 
Then the participant was asked basic demographic questions such as age, gender, and 
student type (if they are a student). It also asked how long the person has owned a 
smartphone and the platform they use.  
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Section 2: Mobile app selection. This section seeks to answer R1: How does 
selection of a mobile app differ when the privacy rating, user rating, and price are 
altered? Which of these factors is considered most important when selecting an 
app? Mobile app stores typically display a price and a user rating on a 5-point scale for 
each app. This section will display both the price and user rating, but also add a privacy 
rating on a 5-point scale, with 1 being a poor privacy rating (i.e., lack of security) and 5 
being an excellent privacy rating (i.e., high security). The privacy rating is included to 
test how it affects the participants’ selection of a mobile relative to the user rating and 
price. Because this section deals with user perceptions of privacy risks as a component of 
the decision-making process when selecting apps, it was placed first in the survey (after 
the demographics) to prevent bias. If it was placed later in the survey, the participants 
will likely realize the survey is about privacy, which may affect their responses.  
This section was based on the survey done by Choe and colleagues (Choe et al., 
2013). Their study tested whether presenting positively- and negatively-framed privacy 
rating scales with or without a user rating of 3 affected the participants’ selection of a 
mobile app. This survey built on their design by incorporating price and varying the user 
and privacy rating scores to a greater extent. The goal was to find a threshold where 
participants balanced the perceived privacy risks with the user rating and price. A pilot 
test helped to determine which combinations of privacy and user ratings and price were 
the most appropriate. In order to rank the factors in order of importance to the 
participants, each combination of privacy rating, user rating, and price will be sorted 
according to the survey results and transitive logic.   
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Section 3: Privacy Permission Selection. This section focuses on R2: How do 
people negotiate privacy risks when selecting or allowing privacy permissions, and do 
their choices vary in different contexts (i.e., a complex vs. simple app)? There are many 
different types of privacy permissions for mobile apps, and participants may feel some 
are more important to them than others. For example, some participants may want to turn 
off location-finding services, but will let the app access their contact information. 
Further, participants may believe some privacy permissions are appropriate in certain 
types of apps, but not in others.  
Because appropriate permission settings may be perceived differently in various 
contexts, three different apps were briefly described to the participants:   
1. FoodWise: Track your diet and exercise, and easily connect to other devices, 
such as Fitbit, or to your selected contacts to motivate each other. Receive personalized 
goals based on your diet profile, or enter your own goals based on advice from your 
doctor or dietitian. 
2. Bright Light: This app instantly turns your phone into a flashlight. Now with 
an easy-to-use interface and strobe mode. 
3. Navigator: This GPS app will find routes, restaurants, shopping, friends, and 
more!  
Participants were then given a list of data types that the app could collect. For 
each data type, they indicated whether they would, would not, or would maybe allow the 
data to be collected. Participants were reminded that limiting data access might affect the 
functionality of the mobile app.  
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    Figure 1. Data types for the privacy permission selection 
Data Types 
Contact information 
Location-sharing 
Photos/camera 
Audio/microphone 
Contacts list 
Social media – Facebook 
Social media – Twitter 
Medical information – Physical (height, weight, gender) 
Medical information – Diagnoses (diabetes, asthma, food 
allergies) 
 
Section 4: Privacy Risk Knowledge. This section focuses on R3: What level of 
knowledge of mobile app privacy risks do adults who own smartphones have? This 
section was based off the privacy risk knowledge survey conducted by Parks and 
colleagues with some question additions and subtractions (Park & Jang, 2014). This 
section consisted of 8 true/false questions on privacy risks in mobile technology. The sum 
of correctly answered questions is the user’s privacy risk knowledge score.   
To answer R4: Does age, gender, type of smartphone, and level of experience 
affect privacy risk knowledge?, analysis of variance (ANOVA) will used to determine 
whether there were any significant differences between the variables. If ANOVA shows 
any significant difference between variables, the Scheffe test will be used to determine 
between which variables there was significant difference.  
Ethics 
Survey methods are generally low-risk in that they do not cause physical harm 
and are unlikely to cause psychological harm. The main ethical concerns for this study 
are the assurance of privacy and anonymity. No identifying information will be retained. 
The only personal information gathered was the email addresses of the participant who 
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wanted to enter the drawing; these email addresses were exported, and then deleted 
shortly after the drawing was completed.   
Because this study deals with human subjects, it was submitted to the University 
of North Carolina at Chapel Hill’s Institutional Review Board (IRB) for review.  All 
study methods, procedures, and materials were approved by IRB in January 2016 before 
releasing the survey.  
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Results 
Sample Demographics  
After the survey was open for 3 weeks, 111 surveys were submitted. Eight surveys 
were not complete; participants dropped the survey around the start of section 2 
(selecting a mobile app) or section 3 (selecting privacy permissions). These surveys were 
removed. The total of complete surveys was N=103, a completion rate of 93%.  
 The combination of convenience and snowball sampling gathered a sample that 
skewed young, female, tech-savvy, and Apple-friendly. Figures 3 and 4 show the age and 
gender of the participants who completed the test. Seventy-two participants reported that 
they are students (65% of the total sample); 74% of the students are master’s students and 
25% are undergraduates.
Figure 2. Gender of Participants 
 
78%
21%
1%
Gender of Participants (n=111)
Female
Male
Prefer not to answer
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Figure 3. Ages of Participants 
 
Participants were also asked what kind of smartphone they own, and how long 
they have owned a smartphone. Apple users and tech-savvy individuals were over-
represented in this survey likely due to the survey being sent to the School of Information 
and Library Science email lists. iPhone users were 68% of the responses. By far most 
participants have owned a smartphone for at least three years, with 38% having owned a 
smartphone for over 5 years.  
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Figure 4. Type of Smartphone Owned 
 
Figure 5. How long have participants owned a smartphone 
 
Mobile App Selection 
 This section had participants compare two mobile app descriptions that included 
user and privacy ratings on a 5-point scale, and a price, either free or $.99. These three 
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factors were varied in order to see how participants negotiate privacy risks with price and 
user ratings, two of the main criteria people use to select between apps to install.  
 The first three questions compared apps with varying user and privacy ratings 
with the price held constant at free. As Figures 4-6 show, about 75% of the participants 
for each question selected the app with highest user rating over the privacy rating.  
Figure 6. Example question 
 
Figure 7. Mobile App Selection 1 
Rating Comparison 
Number of 
Responses 
Percentage 
 
27 25% 
 
83 75% 
 110 100% 
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Figure 8. Mobile App Selection 2 
Rating Comparison 
Number of 
Responses 
Percentage 
 
31 28% 
 
78 72% 
 109 100% 
 
Figure 9. Mobile App Selection 3 
Rating Comparison 
Number of 
Responses 
Percentage 
 
80 73% 
 
29 27% 
 109 100% 
 
The last two questions compared apps with varying prices and privacy ratings, 
while the user rating was held constant at 4 stars. 64% of the participants selected the free 
app with a privacy rating of 3, when compared to the $.99 app with a privacy rating of 5. 
This percentage, however, dropped to 50% when the privacy rating was 2. In other 
words, participants were more willing to install a paid app when the privacy rating 
dropped below 3.  
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Figure 10. Mobile App Selection 4 
Rating Comparison 
Number of 
Responses 
Percentage 
 
39 36% 
 
70 64% 
 109 100% 
 
Figure 11. Mobile App Selection 5 
Rating Comparison 
Number of 
Responses 
Percentage 
 
53 50% 
 
54 50% 
 107 100% 
  
Privacy Permission Selection in Context 
 
This section had participants select which types of data they would or would not 
allow three mobile apps to access. The mobile apps varied in complexity, from a health 
and food tracker to a GPS navigator to a flashlight. Over nearly all data categories, 
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participants indicated that they would not allow the mobile apps to access their data. 
There were, however, some exceptions based on the type of mobile app.  
For FoodWise, the health and food tracker, most participants indicated that they 
would not allow the app to collect most data with the exception of physical medical 
information (e.g, height, weight, gender). It may be that participants considered physical 
medical information a reasonable type of data for this app to collect in order to function 
properly or to be personalized for their needs. While more participants declined access to 
diagnoses medical information (e.g., diabetes, asthma, food allergies), the percentage 
between ‘no’ and ‘yes’ was very close (39% versus 35%, respectively), again indicating 
that many participants were negotiating between the privacy risk and the benefits of 
making their medical data accessible.  
Figure 12. FoodWise: Privacy Permission Selection 
 
 Similarly, for the Navigator mobile app that uses GPS, participants were more 
willing to allow access to their location data with 76% participants selecting ‘yes’ and 
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12% selecting ‘maybe.’ Sometimes GPS apps use audio to give directions. Most 
participants denied access to the audio/microphone at 43%, but those allowing access was 
very close at 39%.  
Figure 13. Navigator: Privacy Permission Selection 
 
 By far the majority of participants were opposed to allowing BrightLight, the 
flashlight app, to access their data. A flashlight app generally only needs access the flash 
on the camera in order to function, though it is unknown how many participants would 
know this. There is a slight increase in participants selecting ‘yes’ (14%) and ‘maybe’ 
(8%) for the photos/camera option, which could indicate that a small percentage of 
participants were aware of this and were willing to allow the app to access the camera 
flash. Otherwise, participants were very opposed to allowing a flashlight app collect any 
data.  
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Figure 14. BrightLight: Privacy Permission Selection 
 
Privacy Risk Knowledge 
Each participant answered 8 true/false questions on privacy risks related to mobile 
phones and apps. The privacy risk knowledge score was calculated by adding 1 point for 
every correct answer and 0 points for every incorrect answer for a high score of 8. The 
average privacy risk knowledge score was 5.4. Only two participants received perfect 
scores of 8, and all participants answered at least 2 questions correctly. Figure 15 displays 
the number of participants who got each score.  
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Contact information
Photos/Camera
Audio/Microphone
Contacts list
Location-sharing
Facebook
Twitter
Medical - Physical
Medical - Diagnoses
Percentage of Participants
Ty
p
e
 o
f 
D
at
a
BrightLight: Privacy Permission Selection
Yes
Maybe
No
 30 
Figure 15. Privacy Risk Knowledge Scores 
  
Participants were well aware that companies and social media websites monitor 
their browsing and use their data for advertising. Most participants answered questions 
such as “Most mobile apps, such as m-Facebook or m-Yahoo, monitor and record your 
browsing” correctly (89%). Nearly all participants answered, “Companies today have the 
ability to place an ad that targets you based on information collected on your mobile 
phone” correctly (99%). Participants were less certain, however, on more technical 
questions. 60% of users answered true for the question “The goal of encrypted data 
transmission is that only the user can see the data,” when the answer is false.  
ANOVA was used to determine if there are differences in privacy risk knowledge 
between subgroups. Differences in age, for example, may show that older adults are less 
or more knowledgeable about privacy risks than adults under 30. Because this sample 
was skewed to people in their 20s and had much lower amount of participants older than 
40, ANOVA was performed twice, once with the original age groups (18-22, 23-29, 30-3, 
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40-49, 50-59, and 60+), and again with participants in their 40s, 50s, and 60+ grouped 
together (18-22, 23-29, 30-39, 40+). ANOVA with the original age groups found that 
there was a significant difference between the groups. ANOVA with the combined older 
age group did not find a significant difference between the groups. This difference could 
be because there were very few participants in the 40-49, 50-59, and 60+ age ranges 
compared to the 18-22 and 22-29 age groups. Combining the 40s, 50s, 60s age groups 
made a sample closer in size to the 18-22 and 22-29 age groups, but there was no longer 
any significant difference. A more comparable sample size between age groups could 
confirm if there is no difference in privacy risk knowledge between different age groups.   
Figure 16. ANOVA analysis for original age groups & privacy risk knowledge score 
 
Source of     Sum of       d.f.    Mean         F 
 Variation     Squares              Squares 
 
  between      20.00          5     4.001        3.218     
  error        121.8         98     1.243     
  total        141.8        103 
The probability of this result, assuming the null 
hypothesis, is 0.0099 
 
 
Figure 17. ANOVA analysis for combined age groups & privacy risk knowledge 
score 
 
Source of     Sum of       d.f.    Mean         F 
 Variation     Squares              Squares 
 
  between      7.850          3     2.617        1.953     
  error        134.0        100     1.340     
  total        141.8        103 
The probability of this result, assuming the null 
hypothesis, is 0.13 
 
 32 
 ANOVA analysis was also done for level of experience as indicated by the years 
an individual has owned a smartphone, gender, and type of smartphone. Only gender was 
found to be statistically significant.  
Figure 18. ANOVA analysis for gender & privacy risk knowledge score 
 
Source of     Sum of       d.f.    Mean         F 
 Variation     Squares              Squares 
 
  between      5.984          1     5.984        4.528     
  error        133.5        101     1.322     
  total        139.5        102 
The probability of this result, assuming the null 
hypothesis, is 0.036 
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Discussion 
R1. How does selection of a mobile app differ when the privacy rating, 
user rating, and price are altered? What factor is considered the 
most important to selection of a mobile app?  
 
In order to determine how participants negotiated between privacy rating, user 
rating, and price, participants’ preferences from section 1 were compared and ranked 
using the transitive property. This process revealed that participants consistently ranked 
user rating the most important, followed by price, and lastly privacy rating. User rating 
can be related to the functionality and usability of the app; if an app has a low user rating, 
about three-quarters of participants are not going to install it, no matter the privacy rating. 
Price, however, can help mediate this affect. If the user rating is fairly high, once the 
privacy rating dips below 3 stars, users are willing to pay for a more secure mobile app.  
There are some limitations based on the comparison questions asked. It is possible 
that a threshold exists where privacy and user rating are more balanced. Additional 
comparisons would need to be asked to determine where the balance point is. Another 
limitation is that no comparison questions were asked that changed all three factors at the 
same time. This was done in order to isolate specific changes, but additional questions 
varying all three factors could help pinpoint nuances in how people negotiate these 
factors.  
Even so, it is clear from the results of this study that user rating is by 
 34 
far the most important factor considered. Any company or organization wanting to add a 
privacy rating scale to the app stores may need to consider alternate ways to present the 
information. Customers may not notice the privacy rating or ignore it depending on what 
the user rating is.  
R2. How do people negotiate privacy risks when selecting or allowing 
privacy permissions, and do their choices vary in different 
contexts? 
  
 Based on the trends displayed in Figures 12-14, most participants were cautious 
about allowing the mobile app to access their data except in specific, function-related 
circumstances. Most participants would allow the food and nutrition tracking mobile app 
to access their physical medical information; similarly, a strong majority of people would 
allow the GPS app to track their location. They were very opposed, however, to allowing 
the flashlight app to access any data. These results align with the Nissenbaum’s theory of 
contextual integrity and Shklovski’s study of mobile app “creepiness” (Nissenbaum, 
2010; Shklovski et al., 2014). Certain privacy permissions are considered acceptable in 
certain contexts, but inappropriate in others. A flashlight app that collects data outside of 
its purpose would likely seem inappropriate and even creepy to many people. What is 
considered acceptable also varies by person, and what their purpose for using the app is. 
For example, some individuals may want to use the food and nutrition tracker with social 
media in order to connect with friends. In this study, 24% of participants would allow this 
app to access Facebook and 21% would allow it to access Twitter. Other individuals, 
however, may consider this a major privacy infringement (72% for Twitter and 67% for 
Facebook).  
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Some participants are willing to reveal personal information in order to use 
certain app functions or personalize it to their needs or preferences. Control over where 
and when this happens is likely to be the main issue. Future research could delve more 
into this concept by seeing if participants would or would not allow, for example, a GPS 
app to access their location when they are not using it as opposed to when they are.  
R3. What level of knowledge of mobile app privacy risks do adults who 
own smartphones have?  
 
 Based on a short, true/false quiz, the participants of this study were overall 
knowledgeable about mobile phone and app privacy risks. The average score was 5.4 
questions correct out of 8, and the median score was 6. As expected, participants were 
well aware that companies collect their data and use it for advertising.  
Participants were less aware about the more technical aspects of privacy. Most 
participants (79%) incorrectly answered the question “Most app permissions seek access 
to a device’s hardware, rather than a user’s personal information.” This may be due to a 
misconception that privacy risks are only or usually related to accessing personal 
information. A Pew Research reported that 70% of Android app permissions seek access 
to the device’s hardware, such as Internet connectivity or camera flash, rather than 
personal information (Anderson, 2015). This is an important distinction to consider when 
displaying privacy permissions. If individuals generally consider privacy permissions to 
be related to personal data, they may misunderstand that most mobile apps are asking for 
hardware-related permissions such as access to the flash or vibrator. Dismissing these 
permissions will affect the functionality of the mobile app. A short explanation 
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explaining why an app needs permission for a particular function may help in these 
circumstances.   
R4. How does age, gender, type of smartphone and level of experience 
relate to privacy risk knowledge? 
 
 According to the results of the ANOVA tests, only the participants' gender 
showed a statistically significant affect on privacy risk knowledge score. On average, 
women scored 5.3, and men scored 5.9. This effect could be due to the sampling; there 
were almost four times the number of women (n=81) completing the survey than men 
(n=21).  
 For age, a statistically significant effect was found for the original age 
groupings (18-22, 23-29, 30-39, 40-49, 40-59, 60+). This effect disappeared when the 
participants who were 40+ years were grouped together to create a more comparable 
sample size to the younger age groups (18-22, 23-29, 30-39, 40+). With this data, it is 
difficult to say if there is a statistically significant effect of age on privacy risk 
knowledge. A broader sample that includes a similar number of older and younger 
individuals could confirm if this difference is statistically significant. However, these 
results do align with a study done by Pew Research. When asked about the acceptability 
of different scenarios on privacy risks, Pew Research found no consistent demographic 
answers by age, income, education, or gender (Rainie, et. al., 2016).  
 Limitations 
There are several limitations to this research study. First is the sampling method. 
Convenience and snowball sampling have the advantage of being quick and cost-
effective, but they almost inevitably lead to results that are not generalizable to rest of the 
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population. This sample was primarily collected from university post-graduate students in 
their 20s. This group may be more knowledge about technology and privacy, and may 
have different opinions on privacy compared to the rest of the population. Because of this 
sample representation, it was difficult to use ANOVA analysis to differentiate between 
sub-groups, especially age or experience. Further, not all individuals who received the 
email message filled out the survey. It could be that the individuals who answered the 
survey had different opinions and knowledge about privacy and mobile apps.  
A second limitation is that this survey measured the individual's intentions, not 
their actual behavior. This is a common issue with studies involving mobile technology 
and privacy, and few studies have been able to devise their methodology to measure 
actual behavior (Keith et al., 2014). While intentions can tell us much about people's 
opinions and state of mind regarding privacy, the privacy paradox theory suggests that 
intentions do not often match with behavior. In the case of this research study, 
participants may not want the mobile apps to access their data except in specific 
circumstances, but in the real world would allow it to happen. This could happen because 
they want to reap the benefits of the app anyway, do not know that the app is collecting 
the data, or they cannot or do not know how to turn it off.  
Lastly, while this survey was designed to gather quantitative data, qualitative data 
could give more insight into why the participants responded the way they did. Qualitative 
data might reveal more of the nuances of why participants selected a certain app, or 
would turn on or off particular privacy permissions. 
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Conclusion  
Mass data collection enabled by the unprecedented growth of smartphones and 
mobile apps has become part of everyday life. Consumers have little knowledge about the 
extent of privacy risks taken when using mobile apps, and are unlikely to be informed by 
federal regulations or privacy certifications. This study examined people's knowledge and 
perceptions of privacy risks in mobile apps, particularly how they negotiate risks in 
various contexts. Generally people see user rating as the most important factor to 
consider, followed by price, both of which give some indication of the usability and 
usefulness of the mobile app. This study showed that privacy rating was the least 
important factor people considered when selecting a mobile app.  Despite knowledge of 
privacy risks, most consumers appear to see privacy in mobile apps as contingent and 
context-dependent. This study has important implications for how privacy permissions 
and ratings can be presented to consumers to best inform their decisions. Presentation, 
clarity, and context all influence consumers’ decisions to install and use mobile apps. 
Developers, researchers and policy-makers need to be understand the trade-offs that 
consumers are willing to make, and explicitly provide consumers with explanations for 
privacy permissions and options to modify privacy settings. Hopefully in the future, 
consumers will have the information about privacy and mobile apps needed to make 
well-informed decisions.
 39 
Bibliography 
Ackerman, L. (2013). Mobile Health and Fitness Applications and Information Privacy. 
Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, San Diego, CA.  
 
Acquisti, A., & Grossklags, J. (2005). Privacy and rationality in individual decision 
making. IEEE Security & Privacy(1), 26-33.  
 
Anderson, Monica. (2015). Key takeaways on mobile apps and privacy. Pew Research 
Center. Retrieved from: http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/11/10/key-
takeaways-mobile-apps/ 
 
Atienza, A. A., Zarcadoolas, C., Vaughon, W., Hughes, P., Patel, V., Chou, W. Y. S., & 
Pritts, J. (2015). Consumer Attitudes and Perceptions on mHealth Privacy and 
Security: Findings From a Mixed-Methods Study. Journal of Health 
Communication, 20(6), 673-679. doi:10.1080/10810730.2015.1018560 
 
Bal, G. (2014). Designing privacy indicators for smartphone app markets: A new 
perspective on the nature of privacy risks of apps. Paper presented at the 20th 
Americas Conference on Information Systems, AMCIS 2014. 
 
Choe, E. K., Jung, J., Lee, B., & Fisher, K. (2013). Nudging people away from privacy-
invasive mobile apps through visual framing Human-Computer Interaction–
INTERACT 2013 (pp. 74-91): Springer. 
 
Enck, W., Gilbert, P., Han, S., Tendulkar, V., Chun, B.-G., Cox, L. P., & Sheth, A. N. 
(2014). TaintDroid: An Information-Flow Tracking System for Realtime Privacy 
Monitoring on Smartphones. ACM Trans. Comput. Syst., 32(2), 1-29. 
doi:10.1145/2619091 
 
Felt, A. P., Ha, E., Egelman, S., Haney, A., Chin, E., & Wagner, D. (2012). Android 
permissions: user attention, comprehension, and behavior. Paper presented at the 
Proceedings of the Eighth Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security, 
Washington, D.C. http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?doid=2335356.2335360 
 
Ferreira, D., Kostakos, V., Beresford, A. R., Lindqvist, J., & Dey, A. K. (2015). 
Securacy: an empirical investigation of Android applications' network usage, 
privacy and security. Paper presented at the Proceedings of the 8th ACM 
 40 
Conference on Security & Privacy in Wireless and Mobile Networks, New York, New 
York. http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?doid=2766498.2766506
 
Fife, E., & Orjuela, J. (2012). The privacy calculus: Mobile apps and user perceptions of 
privacy and security. International Journal of Engineering Business Management, 
5(6), 7.  
 
Fu, H., Yang, Y., Shingte, N., Lindqvist, J., & Gruteser, M. (2014). A field study of run-
time location access disclosures on android smartphones. Proc. USEC, 14.  
 
Furberg, R. (2013). The regulatory context of mobile health in the United States and a 
conceptual framework for privacy and security. European Journal of ePractice, 
21, 66-75.  
 
Keith, M. J., Babb, J. S., & Lowry, P. B. (2014, 6-9 Jan. 2014). A Longitudinal Study of 
Information Privacy on Mobile Devices. Paper presented at the System Sciences 
(HICSS), 2014 47th Hawaii International Conference. 
 
Keith, M. J., Thompson, S. C., Hale, J., Lowry, P. B., & Greer, C. (2013). Information 
disclosure on mobile devices: Re-examining privacy calculus with actual user 
behavior. International Journal of Human Computer Studies, 71(12), 1163-1173. 
doi:10.1016/j.ijhcs.2013.08.016 
 
Kelley, P. G., Cranor, L. F., & Sadeh, N. (2013). Privacy as part of the app decision-
making process. Paper presented at the Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference on 
Human Factors in Computing Systems. 
 
Lin, J., Amini, S., Hong, J. I., Sadeh, N., Lindqvist, J., & Zhang, J. (2012). Expectation 
and purpose: understanding users' mental models of mobile app privacy through 
crowdsourcing. Paper presented at the Proceedings of the 2012 ACM Conference 
on Ubiquitous Computing, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.  
 
Misra, S. (2014). Happitique's recent setback shows that health app certification is a 
flawed proposition. iMedical Apps. Retrieved from 
http://www.imedicalapps.com/2014/01/happtiques-setback-future-app-
certification/ 
 
Nissenbaum, H. F. (2010). Privacy in context: technology, policy, and the integrity of 
social life. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Law Books. 
 
Norberg, P. A., Horne, D. R., & Horne, D. A. (2007). The privacy paradox: Personal 
information disclosure intentions versus behaviors. The Journal of Consumer 
Affairs, 41(1), 100-126.  
 
 41 
Park, Y. J., & Jang, S. M. (2014). Understanding privacy knowledge and skill in mobile 
communication. Computers in Human Behavior, 38, 296-303. 
doi:10.1016/j.chb.2014.05.041 
 
Rainie, L, & Duggan, M. (2016). Privacy and Information Sharing. Pew Research 
Center. Retrieved from: http://www.pewinternet.org/2016/01/14/privacy-and-
information-sharing/  
 
Shklovski, I., Mainwaring, S. D., Skúladóttir, H. H., & Borgthorsson, H. (2014). 
Leakiness and creepiness in app space: Perceptions of privacy and mobile app 
use. Paper presented at the Proceedings of the 32nd annual ACM conference on 
Human factors in computing systems. 
 
Smith, H. J., Dinev, T., & Xu, H. (2011). Information privacy research: An 
interdisclipinary review. Mis Quarterly, 35(4), 980-A927.  
 
Sunyaev, A., Dehling, T., Taylor, P. L., & Mandl, K. D. (2014). Availability and quality 
of mobile health app privacy policies. Journal of the American Medical 
Informatics Association, amiajnl-2013-002605.  
 
Sutanto, J., Palme, E., Tan, C. H., & Phang, C. W. (2013). Addressing the 
personalization-privacy paradox: An empiracle assessment from a field 
experiment on smartphone users. Mis Quarterly, 37(4), 1141.  
 
Wildemuth, B. M. (2009). Applications of social research methods to questions in
 information and library science. Westport, Conn.: Libraries Unlimited.  
 
Xu, H., Gupta, S., Rosson, M. B., & Carroll, J. M. (2012). Measuring mobile users’ 
concerns for information privacy. Paper presented at the Proceedings of the 33rd 
International Conference on Information Systems.  
 
 
